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Amid the stash uncovered during a raid on a Taliban bomb-making house in 2009 was 
a Sony PlayStation controller, most likely used as a detonation device.2  In a Taliban 
propaganda video, a commander is shown touring a roomful of young men working 
on computers.3  Once notorious for their ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam which 
prescribed a complete aversion to all manifestations of modernity, the Taliban now 
appear to have mastered innovations in technology and put them to optimal use in 
their insurgency against Hamid Karzai’s government and ISAF troops.  
 
Terrorist organisations are learning organisations.  In the 1980s, the Red Army Faction 
began to apply a special ointment to their fingers which prevented their fingerprints 
from transferring onto any surfaces.  They adopted this technique after pouring over 
the details of every court case against them, and learning that the German police could 
usually obtain fingerprints from the bottom of toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators.4  
In the words of Martha Crenshaw, “terrorists engage in a process of constant 
adaptation to the strategic environment”.5 Despite the widespread portrayal of Islamic 
terrorists as fanatics who employ violence unthinkingly, as an end in itself, an 
important component of jihadi preparation has always been to painstakingly 
deconstruct past operations with the aim of identifying mistakes and lessons learned.  
For example, in his autobiography, Ayman al-Zawahiri analyses the failures of the Al-
Jihad group in Egypt and the weaknesses of the coup attempt in 1974 and the 1981 
armed rebellion in Asyut (“an emotional uprising that was poorly planned”).6  The 
important al-Qaeda strategist, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, also devotes countless pages to 
critically assessing “the Jihadi current” from 1963-2001.7    
 
The Taliban, too, have learned something from their past mistakes.  On the heels of the 
NATO invasion, the so-called ‘neo-Taliban’ regrouped in 2002 evidencing important 
discontinuities with the ‘old Taliban’ of 1994-2001.  The adaptation has been tactical as 
well as strategic.  The PlaySation controller not only represents the technological 
evolution of the Taliban, but also their ideological evolution, as they strive to moderate 
their policies and establish themselves as a mainstream independence movement.  This 
paper will discuss features of the ideological evolution of the Taliban and its quest for 
legitimacy in Afghanistan.  First, it will examine their rise to prominence.  
 
 
Emergence and objectives 
 
Accounts of the exact emergence of the Taliban conflict, but they share in common the 
depiction of the Taliban as religious students forced to abandon their studies to answer 
the desperate calls of their countrymen.  Certainly, anarchy prevailed in Afghanistan in 
the early 1990s, as former mujahidin fought a brutal civil war after the departure of the 
Soviets, and rape, pillage and extortion became commonplace.  According to Mullah 
Wakil Ahmed, “some local leaders, particularly in Kandahar, formed armed gangs that 
fought each other.  There was widespread corruption and theft, and there were 
                                                 
2 In Fox News report of 12 June 2009 posted on ‘Taliban Militants use PlayStation Controller as Bomb 
Detonator’, youtube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oIbqUhqC-zE [accessed 12 April 2010]. 
3 Joanna Nathan, ‘Reading the Taliban’ in Antonio Giustozzi (ed), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from 
the Afghan Field (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p.28. 
4 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.250. 
5 Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches, in David 
Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organisations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p.16. 
6 ‘The Military Technical College affair’.  See Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner 
(Autobiography, 2001), in reprinted in Laura Mansfield, In His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of 
Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri (USA: TLG Publications, 2006), pp.53-63.   
7 See for example, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, reprinted in Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: 
The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri (London: Hurst, 2007), pp.349-419. 
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roadblocks everywhere.  Women were being attacked, raped and killed.  Therefore, 
after these incidents, a group of students from religious schools decided to rise against 
these leaders in order to alleviate the suffering of the residents of Kandahar Province”.8  
Marrying extreme piety with a humanitarian impulse, the Taliban emerged, then, as a 
moral project. 
 
One story of the Taliban’s founding proceeds thus: 
On 20 September 1994, a Herati family, while on its way to Kandahar from 
Herat, was stopped at a check point ninety kilometres short of Kandahar by 
local mujahideen bandits.  The men and women were separated.  The boys were 
taken away and molested.  The girls were repeatedly raped until they became 
unconscious.  Later all of them were killed and their bodies partially burnt.  It 
was Mullah Omar (sometimes referred to as Mullah Mujahid) who was the first 
to arrive on the scene.  He is reported to have gathered some talibs who helped 
him in collecting the bodies.  These were washed and given a decent burial.  He 
then gathered the [religious] students and pledged to start a campaign to get 
rid of such criminals... The Taliban movement had begun.9   
The theme underlying Ahmad Rashid’s account is the same: in the spring of 1994 
Mullah Omar had enlisted some 30 talibs to rescue two teenage girls who had been 
abducted and repeatedly raped at a military base in his hometown of Sangesar.  With 
only 16 rifles between them,  the Talibs freed the girls and hung the camp commander 
from the barrel of a tank.  A few months later, Mullah Omar answered the pleas of his 
fellow citizens once more and came to the rescue of a young boy that two commanders 
were fighting over on the streets of Kandahar.  Asking for no reward save help in 
establishing an Islamic system, Mullah Omar’s prestige grew rapidly.10   
 
Whatever the details of the seminal Robin Hood event, crucial to the Taliban’s rise was 
the support of Pakistan, which was seeking secure land routes for trade with Central 
Asia.  Initially, Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Baber enlisted Omar’s men to 
rescue a truck convoy hijacked by a group of bandits outside Kandahar in November 
2004.  After the resounding success of the operation, Pakistan quickly took the Taliban 
under its wing. 11 And in a matter of months, Mullah Omar’s men had taken most of 
the country.  
 
The Taliban’s immediate goals were to disarm all rival militia, fight against those who 
refused to disarm, enforce Islamic law and retain all areas captured by the Taliban.12  
The simple strategic vision for Afghanistan, the enforcement of the sharia, began as a 
significant source of strength for the Taliban, as their rivals had not offered a 
competing conception of what the future would look like.  In fact, the alternative 
conception of the state was an empowering feature for Islamist movements in 
Afghanistan throughout the twentieth century.  The traditional religious establishment 
was not concerned with the state, but with civil society: its role was not political but 
instead moral and legal.  Religious leaders did not involve themselves in politics and, 
when it came to the state, “their position [was] essentially a negative one”.13   Even 
during the jihad against the Soviets, the traditional Sufi leadership and the urban 
nationalists were crippled by their “unwillingness or inability to state objectives for a 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed 
Books, 1998), p.61. 
9 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp.25-6. 
10 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2008), p.25. 
11 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.221.   
12 Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, p.26. 
13 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.50. 
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future free Afghanistan other than the restoration of the conditions prior to the events 
precipitating the crisis”.14  As a result, the Islamist parties prevailed. 
 
Yet, even when the Islamists came to power in the early-to-mid 1990s, they failed to 
implement any Islamist policies.  Olivier Roy points out that “no measures that could 
be labelled ‘Islamist’ were taken by the government chaired by Burhanuddin Rabbani 
during its four-year tenure”.15  Despite a ban on alcohol and the enforcement of the veil, 
the same Hindi movies were shown in the half-destroyed cinemas, female anchors 
continued to work in state television and the former communist administration was 
retained.  Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also did little to establish Islamic institutions in the 
areas he controlled.16  Thus, when the Taliban came to power, the opportunity to 
pursue a genuinely Islamic agenda in Afghanistan, which had been frequently missed 
by other political actors, was theirs for the taking.    
 
However, after the capture of Kabul the Taliban issued no manifesto.  There was no 
administration and no foreign policy, no public services and no economic plan.  Gilles 
Kepel describes how “in Kabul, the Taliban did not so much take control of Afghan 
institutions as completely eviscerate them, erecting in their stead only three functions: 
morality, commerce and war”.17  The simplicity of the Taliban’s Islamic vision for 
society was laid bare, as it boiled down to severe prescriptions for personal morality.  
Men were compelled to grow beards and pray at the mosque five times a day; women 
were forced to wear the burqa and forbidden from work (and thus war widows could 
not feed themselves and their children).  Music, dancing and kite-flying were banned.  
The Taliban’s most robust institution was charged with enforcing these strictures, a 
religious police force named after the Quranic verse which enjoins commanding the 
good and forbidding the evil (Amr bi al-Maroof wa Nahi an al-Munkar).  An elderly 
Islamic scholar in Herat told a journalist, “we are ruled by men who offer us nothing 
but the Koran, even though many of them cannot read… we are in despair”.18  The 
suffering of the Afghan people, which had allegedly galvanised the talibs in the first 
place, continued—and arguably deepened.   
 
The ‘neo-Taliban’ which reconstituted in 2002 have sought to reclaim the moral 
highroad in Afghanistan.  The first step to that end was to re-brand themselves as a 
broad-based independence movement rather than religious fundamentalists obsessed 
by personal morality.  They exist so as to expel invading forces from Afghanistan and 
defend the Afghan people.  In the manner of Osama bin Laden, their demands are 
framed as intuitive, reasonable and valid across all cultures: “we are not the aggressors 
but only reacting to what you have instigated, if you freedom loving people were put 
in the same predicament, your reactions would be same, you would defend your 
honour and your properties from the invader”.19  Indeed, the western presence in 
Afghanistan has enabled the Taliban to rationalise their existence in more widely-
accepted terms.  The Afghan jihad against the Soviets demonstrated the power of 
channelling nationalist sentiments within an Islamic framework and, at least initially, 
its unifying effects.  Indeed, Islamic and nationalist values are often twinned by the 
                                                 
14 Eden Naby, ‘The Changing Role of Islam as a Unifying Force in Afghanistan’, in Ali Banuazizi and Myron 
Weiner (eds), The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p.149. 
15 Olivier Roy, ‘Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?’, in William Maley (ed), Fundamentalism Reborn? 
Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), p.207. 
16 Roy, ibid. 
17 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p.229. 
18 To New York Times correspondent John Burns, quoted in Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, p.38. 
19 ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Address to the Canadian People in Connection with Killing of Two of its 
Female Citizens’, 17 August 2010, at http://www.alemarah.110mb.com/english-8-17-08-2008.html 
[accessed 11 November 2009].  Unless otherwise stated, all citations of Taliban statements will refer to the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s website at www.alemarah.info and accessed between 12-20 November 
2009.    
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Taliban, who speak of their “lofty Islamic and nationalist aims”.20  In turn, the Taliban 
can attempt to mobilise a distinctly rural constituency (extremely rare in the history of 
Islamist movements), as the Afghan Islamists in the 1970s and 1980s were only able to 
do after the Soviets had invaded.21   
 
In fact, the neo-Taliban have capitalised upon three broad features of the anti-Soviet 
jihad.  Firstly, the mass uprising against the Russians embedded the link between Islam 
and nationalism in Afghanistan.  Secondly, it provided vindication for the Deobandi 
idea that the only the return to Islam will yield liberation from foreign invasion.  
Thirdly, the anti-Soviet jihad permitted the association between atheism and brutality.  
Without doubt, the historical record shows that in times of jihad, the balance of power 
has always shifted from the tribal authority structure to the religious one.  As Olivier 
Roy notes, “the jihad always implies a shift in power relations in favour of religious 
leaders and to the detriment of the khan… it is the external threat which gives Islam its 
energising power”.22  Asta Olsen puts it another way: “like a banner, the mullah shows 
his beauty in a headwind”.23    
 
As nationalist actors upholding the undeniable Islamic right to self-defence, the 
Taliban have hit upon a defining characteristic which speaks to a much more 
mainstream audience.  Their social programme also appears more progressive, as their 
objectives are defined as “independence, Islamic social justice, human dignity and 
national identity”.24  However, the vagueness of this agenda indicates that, as before, 
the Taliban have not yet worked out a sophisticated view of what a genuinely Islamic 
system would look like, and the worry must surely be that a new Taliban regime 
would lapse into the same reductionist and obscurantist version of the faith.  That 
being said, we will see later how, where they have re-taken control, the neo-Taliban 
have promised not to impose their convictions as harshly as before.  
 
Upholding universal norms 
 
While any Taliban regime, however moderated, is likely to challenge ‘western’ political 
norms in the domestic realm, on the international level the Taliban has always sought 
to re-enforce them. Not long after seizing power in 1996, Mullah Omar wrote to US 
President Bill Clinton making a bifurcation between the domestic and the international 
arenas.  He sought to re-assure the Americans that the Taliban had neither the intent 
nor the capability to attack the US: “whatever we are—even if we are as you say 
fundamentalists—we are far from you and we do not intend to harm you and cannot 
harm you either”.25  Of course, al-Qaeda attacks on US interests in 1998 and 2001 were 
to illustrate that far more relevant than the Taliban’s stated intent and capabilities were 
those of the groups being harboured on Afghan soil, owing to Mullah Omar’s political 
manoeuvring and the fundamental weakness of the Afghan state.   
 
Indeed, as Gilles Kepel notes, the Taliban’s “effect on the world was not made through 
a state and they had no diplomatic relations with any country except their Pakistani 
sponsor and their principle commercial partner, the United Arab Emirates… They 
were completely indifferent to politics”.26  Certainly, Mullah Omar proclaimed that the 
Taliban were not influenced by other Islamic systems of government such as could be 
                                                 
20 ‘Remarks of Esteemed Mullah Brader Akhund Made to Media about Obama’s New Strategy’, 30 
October 2009. 
21 Roy, ‘Has Islamism a Future?’, p.205. 
22 Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.61-62. 
23 Asta Olsen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), p.15.   
24 ‘Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Occasion of the Eighth Anniversary of the 
American Attack on Afghanistan’, 7 October 2009. 
25 ‘Text of Mullah Omar’s Letter to President Clinton’, 6 September 1999, reprinted in S. Iftikhar Murshed, 
Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London: Bennett & Bloom, 2006), p.310. 
26 Kepel, Jihad, p.231 
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found in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan – adding, 
somewhat worryingly, that “we do not have enough information on those states’ 
systems”.27  The corresponding lack of impact on international Islamic politics is thus 
unsurprising.  Olivier Roy noted that the Taliban was a purely Afghan movement 
(which had been instrumentalised by Pakistan).  To wit, “the Taliban have no foreign 
policy”.28 
 
Fighting a defensive jihad against Christian invaders, the stateless Taliban have, by 
contrast, had a far more pronounced effect on the international system.  From 
prolonging NATO involvement in Afghanistan and thus directly affecting Western 
politics, to contributing to the destabilisation of Pakistan and the region more generally, 
to serving as a battleground in which radicalised Muslims can confront the ‘global 
Crusader’, the neo-Taliban are significant far beyond Afghanistan’s borders.   However, 
the neo-Taliban have carried over the insistence that their intent and ambitions are 
entirely Afghan-centric.  Countless statements underline that “we did not have any 
agenda to harm other countries including Europe nor [do] we have such [an] agenda 
today”29.  They maintain, too, that “we will not allow our soil to be used against any 
other country”.30   
 
In a special message to the Shaghai Summit in October 2009, the Taliban elaborated its 
‘peaceful policy’ on international relations: 
The IEA wants to have good and positive relations with all neighbours based 
on mutual respect, and to open a new chapter of good neighbourliness of 
mutual cooperation and economic development… The Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, as per its peaceful policy, wants constructive interaction with 
Shanghai forum members, for permanent stability and economic development 
in the region on the basis of mutual respect.31   
But what of occasional Taliban threats to take the battle outside of Afghanistan’s 
borders and into the heart of the West? Anne Stenersen argues that “while individual 
insurgent commanders have issued threats to attack the West, the senior leaders of the 
Afghan Taliban are currently uninterested in pursuing such a strategy”.32  Stenersen 
points out that Mansour Dadullah, who threatened to dispatch suicide bombers to 
western countries in 2007, was later sacked from the Taliban (officially, for refusing to 
obey the chain of command) and that the Taliban is far more interested in using foreign 
volunteers to fight in their local war.  The Taliban has sought to distance itself from 
both al-Qaeda (to be discussed below) and the Pakistani Taliban, which is brazen about 
its involvement in concrete international plots.33  No doubt, foreign attacks would 
increase pressure on the Taliban’s Pakistani sanctuaries.  Further, Mukhtar A Khan 
noted in May 2009 that the Taliban sheltering in Quetta have not sought to challenge 
the Pakistani security forces, instead focusing their efforts on cross-border fighting 
against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.34     
 
In addition to vowing to respect reciprocal sovereignty, the neo-Taliban champion the 
international legal regime more generally.  They maintain that the US-led coalition 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Marsden, The Taliban, p.66. 
28 Roy, ‘Has Islamism a Future?’, p.210. 
29 ‘Statement of the IEA on Occasion of Eighth Anniversary’, op cit.   
30 ‘Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the London 
Conference’, 28 January 2010.  
31 ‘In Open Letter to Shanghai Summit, Taliban Urges Participants to Render Assistance in the Work of 
Liberating People!’, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2599, 15 October 2009.   
32 Anne Stenersen, ‘Are the Afghan Taliban involved in International Terrorism?’, CTC Sentinel, 2:9, 
September 2009, p.2. 
33 Ibid, p.3. 
34 Mukhtar A. Khan, ‘Quetta: The Headquarters of the Afghan Taliban’, in CTC Sentinel, 2:5, May 2009, 
p.6. 
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“invaded our country in contravention of all moral and legal norms and principles”35 
and that “Americans have been tramping down on [the] religious, social, cultural and 
economic rights of the people under the notorious name ‘war on terror’”.36 
 
For the first five years of the war, the Taliban refrained from targeting the United 
Nations, perhaps because it did not want to be seen to attack a respected global actor 
(although Guistozzi suggests it was due to the fact that the Taliban needed the UN as a 
broker in negotiations with the government).37 In any case, when Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon condemned the armed opposition for causing 80 per cent of the civilian death 
toll in Afghanistan, the Taliban accused him of bias, chastised him for “brazenly 
trampl[ing] down on UN principles of neutrality… in order to please the White House 
rulers”, and advised him that such remarks harmed the credibility of an august world 
body.38 Similarly, when the United Nations Security Council extended the mandate for 
international troops in Afghanistan until October 2010, the Taliban protested that, in so 
doing, the Security Council “has categorically violated its Charter and the Geneva 
Convention”, which guarantee sovereignty and self-determination. 39  Indeed, the 
Taliban calls on “all independent institutions, entities, leaders, writers and statesmen to 
join their voice with that of the Islamic Emirate to defend the common and shared 
values of humanity”.40 It also urges human rights organisations to raise their voices 
over the massacre of innocents and to conduct neutral investigations into such deaths.41   
   
Although notorious for assassinating journalists who speak out against them, in their 
statements the Taliban also staunchly uphold norms on media freedom.  In October 
2005, a former Taliban official told Radio Tehran that the detention of Taliban 
spokesmen Ustad Mohammad Yasir and Latifullah Hakimi was against international 
conventions on the freedom of the press.42  It is also claimed that “the mujahidin of the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan do their best to maintain security for independent 
journalists so that the realities can be revealed to the people”.43 By contrast, “the so-
called protectors of democracy and freedom of speech block our websites and spread 
lies against us… They efface the values that the humanity [sic] has achieved after a 
long struggle”.44   
 
Human rights are also mobilised in morally denouncing their adversaries. The 
international community is criticised for engulfing the oppressed Afghan nation with 
“a black cloud of atrocities and violations” under the guise of the Karzai-led 
government, consisting of human rights violators, corrupt drug traffickers and war-
mongerers.  ISAF itself is referred to as “the invading troops and their hireling 
soldiers”,45 and it is condemned for massacring civilians, using noxious weapons such 
as white phosphorous and committing war crimes.  The Taliban derides “the empty 
slogans of democracy”—not least for the cancellation of the presidential run-off in 
                                                 
35 ‘Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the London 
Conference’, 28 January 2010. 
36 ‘Response of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Concerning the Desecration of the Holy Quran and 
Martyrdom of Innocent Afghans’, 15 January 2010.  
37 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: 
Hurst & Co., 2007), p.135. 
38 ‘Response of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Banki Moon Assertions about Civilian Casualties in 
Afghanistan’, 7 January 2010. 
39 MEMRI, October 20, 2009 
40 ‘Response of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Concerning the Desecration of the Holy Quran’, op cit.  
41 ‘Remarks of Z. Mujahid, Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Regarding the Invaders’ 
Recent Brutalities’, 17 December 2009. 
42 Nathan, ‘Reading the Taliban’, p.38, fn 5. 
43 International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 158, ‘Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?, 24 
July 2008, p.8. 
44 ‘The Help of Allah (SwT)’, 16 November 2009. 
45 ‘Response of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Concerning the Desecration of the Holy Quran’, op cit. 
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200946—and criticises the US for the atrocities alleged at such prisons as Bagram 
Airbase, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, for engaging in ‘extraordinary rendition’, 
and for allowing the private security company Blackwater to commit “flagrant human 
rights violations in Iraq”.47  
 
In the neo-Taliban’s discursive framework, Obama is “a violator of peace” leading a 
series of “anti-human activities”48 while the Taliban are “freedom-loving and patriotic 
forces [who] have taken up arms to achieve their aspirations and natural rights”.  
Acting only in self-defence, the Taliban are described as “a freedom-loving, progress-
favouring movement”49 and “a liberation movement”50 fighting to achieve the people’s 
“legitimate rights”51.  In the end, it is the Taliban’s opponents who, under the slogan of 
the war on terror, act “against the universal human values, justice, peace, equal 
distribution of resources and independence”.52  Of course, this reliance on universal 
human values is not easy to square with the Taliban’s track record of injustice and 




As a result, many of the prohibitions which symbolised the austerity of Taliban rule 
during the 1990s are no longer in effect.  To begin with, it is not forbidden to depict 
living images through drawing, film, or photography.  When the Taliban permitted 
occasional exceptions to these strictures before 2001 it was only to allow the filming of 
its fighters by the press, but the ‘neo-Taliban’ are tolerant of television and cinema and 
Taliban commanders are reported to openly watch Indian soap operas featuring 
women dressed in revealing western attire.53  Also, where once “roadblocks by the 
Taliban always included a pole around which were wrapped, like trophies, the tapes 
ripped from audiocassettes that had been seized from motorists”,54 the Taliban have 
more recently produced hundreds of thousands of cassettes and CDs using song to 
support their cause.55   
 
Certainly, as noted in the Introduction, the Taliban have enlisted the full spectrum of 
media technology to cast their shadow over Afghanistan today.  From scores of web 
sites and online publications to millions of explicit DVDs depicting graphic images of 
civilian casualties allegedly perpetrated by western forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Palestine, the Taliban’s manipulation of media technology is unrivalled even by the 
foreign presence in Afghanistan.  As outlined in a report by the International Crisis 
Group, Taliban spokesmen maintain regular contact with journalists through email, 
SMS and telephone calls and provide online reports conveying the Taliban’s side of the 
story on civilian casualties and encounters with foreign forces.  In contrast to 
government and international officials, “journalists stressed that Taliban spokesmen 
responded to queries around the clock”.56  In fact, one journalist complained that the 
Taliban were contacting him too much.  The turnaround with regard to technology has 
not been confined to the informational realm, however.  Laptops and game console 
                                                 
46 See ‘Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Concerning the Cancellation of the Runoff 
Elections, the American Melodrama’, 4 November 2009. 
47 ‘The Help of Allah’, op cit.   
48 ‘Taliban on Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize’, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2611, 22 October 2009. 
49 ‘Taliban in Statement on Security Council’s Extension of Foreign Troops’ Mandate in Afghanistan’, 
MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2606, 20 October 2009. 
50 ‘In Open Letter to Shanghai Summit’, op cit.    
51 ‘Taliban in Statement on Security Council’s Extension’, op cit. 
52 ‘Eid ul-Fitr Message from Taliban Leader Mullah Omar’, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2550, 20 
September 2009.   
53 Nir Rosen, ‘In the Lair of the Taliban’, The Sunday Times, 7 December 2008. 
54 Kepel, Jihad, p.230. 
55 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, p.121. 
56 ICG, ‘Taliban Propaganda’, p.11. 
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controllers have empowered the Taliban on the battlefield, greatly facilitating roadside 
bombs and improvised explosive devices.   
 
In addition to embracing technology, the Taliban has relaxed its prescriptions for 
society.  During the harsh rule beginning in the mid-1990s, men with beards shorter 
than the ‘Islamic’ standard were whipped, drinkers were flagellated with rubber hoses, 
the limbs of thieves amputated and murderers executed, all of which were deemed the 
only legitimate forms of public spectacle as thousands of people were crowded into 
stadiums to watch.  By contrast, Giustozzi reports that as the neo-Taliban grew in 
strength in late 2006-early 2007, 
… they seemed intent on capitalising on a certain shift of opinion in their 
favour by relaxing their ideological strictures.  At least in some of the areas 
under their control, such as Musa Qala, they were no longer demanding that 
men grow a beard, keep their hair short or refrain from watching movies.  This 
appears to have broadened their appeal, particularly in the towns.  Taliban 
commanders were telling journalists that they were not going to impose their 
convictions so ‘harshly’ as when they had previously been in power.57 
Moreover, ordinary people were not to be harassed.  The 2006 Layeha, or code of 
conduct, decreed that Talibs who tormented innocent people were to be expelled from 
the movement.58 
 
One sign of this easing was with regard to the Taliban’s attitude on narcotics.  
Although the Taliban used drug production and trafficking to fund its own activities,59 
poppy cultivation by ordinary Afghans was banned by Mullah Omar.  The neo-Taliban, 
however, seized on the Afghan government’s poppy eradication policy begun in 2005 
and stepped in to protect the farmers and offer them financial assistance.  
Unsurprisingly, drugs were outlawed as deeply immoral under the Taliban, but there 
has been an interesting shift in justification since that era, as voiced by one Taliban 
fighter: “We grow it because it damages non-Muslims.  And that is why we’re growing 
it.  And we should do whatever damages non-Muslims…. Islam says that it is not 
permitted.  But we do not care if it is permitted or forbidden.  But we are only saying 
that we will grow poppies against non-Muslims”.60  Poppy production soared in areas 
under Taliban control, as in Kandahar and Helmand, and it is estimated that farming 
in the latter province is responsible for growing more than half the world’s poppy (and 
also for 40-70% of the Afghan insurgency’s funding).61  The Taliban is believed to levy a 
10% tax on harvests and earn additional transit fees by transporting the drug outside 
Afghanistan.62      
 
Another shift in attitude has occurred with regard to female education.  A series of 
Taliban leaders have spoken out in favour of female education and women’s right to 
work.  Clashes have also been reported between the Taliban and foreign fighters in 
Afghanistan (Arabs and Pakistanis) who tried to close down girls’ schools, with fire 
fights ensuing over the issue.63  The Taliban undoubtedly continues to burn down 
schools and assassinate students and teachers,64 which is accounted for with the 
                                                 
57 Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, p.72. 
58 Layeha of 2006 reprinted in Christopher Dickey, ‘Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Book of Rules’, Newsweek, 
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argument that they only oppose mixed sex schools which peddle propagandist 
curricula, and in January 2007 it was announced that the Taliban would open their own 
schools (for girls too) promoting an ‘Islamic’ curriculum.65  Their statements underline 
the Islamic Emirate’s commitment “to take measures for the fulfilment of our 
countrymen’s educational needs in the light of the fundamentals of Islam and the 
requirements of the contemporary world”.66  Mullah Omar bemoans the fact that the 
Taliban’s enemies “have wrongly depicted us as a force that is against education and 
women’s rights.”67 Such statements represent an ideological turnaround for the Taliban.  
Indeed, the Taliban’s target constituency has expanded to include the educated Afghan 
population, and it is believed to have infiltrated Kabul University.68   
 
The Taliban also seem to have softened their position on the Shia.  The Taliban 
emerged on the political scene as “the revenge of the Pashtuns”, coinciding with a 
wider sense of frustration among the Pashtun population who never recognised 
Islamists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as its representative and resented the fact that 
Kabul was in the hand of non-Pashtuns, for only the second time since the creation of 
the country.69  Some of the worst affected areas by the civil war had been around 
Kandahar, the heartland of the Pashtuns, where mujahidin commanders were engaged 
in drug trafficking, extortion and rape.  As a result, “most Pashtun commanders, 
whatever their ideological affiliation joined or approved of the Taliban… By the same 
token, no well-known non-Pashtun figures joined the Taliban”.70  Indeed, the long 
beards and turbans which became the Taliban hallmark had long been a part of 
Kandahari culture71—in a sense, the Taliban sought to universalise a specifically 
Pashtun custom and enforce its adoption across Afghanistan, as a visible expression of 
piety but also as a symbol of the Taliban’s political monopoly.  
 
Representing one of the most brutal strains of puritanical Sunnism, the Taliban 
pursued a virulent anti-Shia agenda.  In the words of Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “the 
fruits of an Islamic system ha[d] a sectarian taste, however”.72  The governor of Mazar 
i-Sharif proclaimed outright that “Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shia.  They are 
[kuffar]… wherever you go we will catch you. If you go up, we will pull you down by 
your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair”.73  Shortly thereafter, 
Mazar i-Sharif became the scene of a brutal massacre, in which the Taliban conducted 
house-to-house searches for Hazara men, shooting them in the head, chest or testicles, 
suffocating them to death in shipping containers or slitting their throats.  Up to 8000 
were killed, with thousands more maimed or raped.74  Nine Iranian diplomats were 
also slaughtered at Mazar i-Sharif, taking Afghanistan to the brink of war with Iran.   
In a Taliban religious inquiry (istifta), one cleric maintained that the Iranians’ Shia 
beliefs were “wicked and corrupt” and “a direct criticism of Islam itself”.75  The Shia 
were targeted in other parts of Afghanistan, too, and the country was equally unsafe 
                                                                                                                                               
and James Palmer, ‘Taliban Kill Afghan Students, Burn Schools’, Washington Times, 28 May 2009, at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/28/taliban-takes-battle-to-schools.   
65 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, pp.104-5. 
66 ‘Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the London 
Conference’, 28 January 2010. 
67 ‘Eid ul-Fitr Message from Taliban Leader’, op cit. 
68 Colonel David Benest, ‘Hot Stabilisation Strategy for Afghanistan?’, seminar for the Changing Character 
of War Programme, University of Oxford, 10 June 2008.   
69 Roy, ‘Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?’, p.208. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, p.37. 
72 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulema in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), p.139. 
73 Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif’, 1 November 1998, at  
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0-03.htm#P186_38364 [accessed 12 December 2009]. 
74 See Michael Sheridan, ‘How the Taliban Slaughtered 8,000’, Sunday Times, November 1, 1998.  The 
Taliban claimed to be avenging the killing of Taliban prisoners by Hazaras the previous year.   
75 Abdul ‘Ula Deobandi in M. J. Gohari, The Taliban: Ascent to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p.126. 
  11 
for Hindus, Sikhs and Jews.  In early 2001, the Taliban destroyed two statues of 
Buddha carved into the cliffs at Bamyan, which dated from the sixth century and were 
also a part of popular Shia folklore.   
 
The bloody sectarianism which stained the Taliban era certainly marked a rupture with 
the past.  Nineteenth century British travellers reported on Afghans as devout Muslims 
and tolerant towards other faiths76 and communal interconnections, through marriages 
in particular, were higher in Afghanistan as compared to the Middle East, Central Asia 
and the Indian subcontinent.77  Yet it is worth noting that, historically, religious 
persecution was not unknown in Afghanistan.  In the nineteenth century, for example, 
Amir Abderahman vilified the Hazara Shia and solicited fatwas condoning attacks on 
them.  Under the relatively moderate reign of Aminullah in the 1920s, the Constitution 
provided that the followers of certain unacceptable sects were “to be killed”.78  Harsh 
attitudes towards the Shia specifically persisted well into the twentieth century: 
The Shi’ite minority has always been far removed from the centres of power; 
they have been looked down upon and, until 1963, were practically outside the 
law.  Their religious practices (praying with palms upraised, the procession of 
moharram) were forbidden and the Jaffarite law was not recognised by the state.  
It was impossible for them to pursue a career in the army or in politics.79 
What’s more, after the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1988 and despite the fighting 
prowess shown by minority groups during the resistance, minority rights were not 
dealt with.  The mujahidin’s Charters declared the supremacy of Hanafi jurisprudence 
(a Sunni school of law),80 and the Shias were largely left out of the process of political 
reconstruction.   
 
Vitriol against the Shia has largely dropped out of the neo-Taliban’s discourse.  There 
have also been reports that the Taliban are working with Shia commanders.81  The 
Taliban seek to build a constructive relationship with Iran, even defending the regime 
in the face of Security Council condemnation.82    
  
But while the Taliban’s adaptability has been a force for moderation on many issues, it 
has led to a more radical evolution on others.  Heralding the arrival of suicide bombing, 
Mullah Dadullah announced that “now we are going to change our tactics, using a new 
weapon we did not have in the past”.83  Until mid-2003, and despite decades of war, 
the tactic had been unknown in the country, anathema as it is to the Afghan tradition, 
code of honour and culture (especially martial culture).84  Dadullah proudly confessed 
that the Taliban had learned the technique from their Arab ‘brothers’,85 and its utility 
was surely demonstrated by the war in Iraq.  Although many suicide bombings were 
outsourced to non-Afghans, with Pakistanis, Arabs, Bangladeshis and even a Malian 
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citizen arrested for plotting such attacks,86 young Afghans also embraced the tactic and 
its attendant ‘cult of martyrdom’ (final interviews with bombers, footage capturing the 
carnage, tributes lionising the perpetrators).  Indeed, the vast majority of the 140 
bombings which occurred in 2006 were carried out by Afghans or Pakistani Pashtuns.87  
In a 2008 DVD, one spokesman claimed that the Taliban was overwhelmed with 
volunteers for suicide bombings operations, including females, and that the Taliban 
“cannot provide enough [suicide] waistcoats”.88   
 
Unlike in Iraq, however, Taliban suicide bombings are primarily directed towards 
foreign forces and government officials. The Taliban repeatedly fails to claim 
responsibility for blasts which kill large numbers of civilians and Taliban foot soldiers 
have been ordered to “try your best to avoid killing local people” when conducting 
suicide attacks.89  The tactic remains controversial among the Taliban leadership and 
Mullah Omar is believed to have opposed an increase in its use due to concerns over 




As discussed earlier, the Taliban views itself as a grassroots movement which was 
formed to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people: “The Taliban, who have 
emerged from the masses of the people, have started their struggle to deliver their 
compatriots from pain and hardship…”(1996)91; “The Mujahideen have sprouted from 
among the people.  They live among them and share their joy and pains” (2010).92  The 
Neo-Taliban are careful to underline, too, that they fight to defend their compatriots 
against the “infidel occupant forces”.93  As such, popular support is as critical to the 
Taliban’s strategic narrative as it is to their ability to keep the insurgency alive through 
information, supply and safe passage. 
 
It is worth noting that popular support has been hard to come by for Islamists in 
Afghanistan.  When Gulbiddin Hekmatyar attempted to foment an Islamist uprising 
against Daoud’s regime in 1975, Roy describes how “only in the north-east was there 
anything approaching an uprising; in the rest of the country, including Paktya, where 
Hekmatyar was, nothing happened… People were not with the movement”.94  Not 
only did the peasants fail to stir, they actively turned the Islamists in to the government 
forces.95  Later, during the resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, 
the self-appointed leadership ultimately distanced itself from its support base.  Ashraf 
Ghani concluded that “the main shortcoming of the resistance has been an inability to 
pay attention to the local needs of the communities or attempt to win over the 
confidence of the local people… Speaking in the name of Islam has neither brought 
unity of ranks nor unconditional popular support”.96   
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Undoubtedly, the legitimacy sought in Afghanistan is often specifically Islamic.  In the 
nineteenth century, with the territorial expansion of the European imperial powers into 
the region and a succession of Afghan rulers who were not viewed as credible, Islam 
emerged as the dominant legitimating discourse in Afghanistan.  From 1818 onward, a 
series of movements which opposed the state stressed Islam as their dominant 
symbol. 97   As the culmination of a power struggle between the centre and the 
countryside, the state and the tribal structure, the reformist King Amanullah was 
overthrown in 1929 under the slogan ‘Islam is in danger’.  His modernists policies were 
(successfully) depicted as western-instigated attacks on Islam; “religion became a focal 
point for opposition that was essentially political”.98  In 1970, there was huge public 
outcry when a Marxist journal published a poem celebrating Lenin’s centenary which 
used words reserved for the Prophet.  For the first time, the clergy and the militant 
Islamists worked together but their demonstrations were violently repressed.99  As the 
parliament failed to act, the government itself was attacked for not following the tenets 
of Islam and the opposition’s demands became diversified to include banning alcohol, 
reintroducing the veil and the abolition of secular education and legislation.100   
 
The Marxist regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki offended similar sensitivities.  In 1978, 
Taraki eliminated all Islamic symbolism from the Afghan flag and took to executing 
members of the traditional religious leadership.  Along with his peddling of Marxist 
jargon, this “gradually led to the alienation of the majority of the Afghans in the 
countryside.  The ranks of the revolutionary Muslim groups swelled, particularly in the 
absence of any other foci for opposition to the government”.101  
 
As religious ‘students’ espousing a literalist version of Islam and enforcing a 
fundamentalist interpretation of the sharia, the Taliban’s Islamic credentials were more 
readily apparent.  The son of a village mullah and a mullah himself, the Taliban’s 
leader was renowned for doing much of his strategic thinking on his prayer mat.102  In 
order to authenticate his role as a ruler ordained by God to lead the Afghan people, 
Mullah Omar drew upon both Islamic and Pashtun motifs.  In 1996, he visited the 
shrine of the Cloak of the Prophet, which is situated next to the tomb of Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, the founder of the Pashtun dynasty which ruled Afghanistan for 300 years.  
Standing in Kandahar’s central bazaar, Mullah Omar removed the cloak and wore it in 
front of a large crowd of followers.  He was then named Amir al-Mo’mineen 
(Commander of the Faithful).103  In donning the cloak of the Prophet, the Taliban’s 
leader surely sought to adopt Mohammad’s mantle, as he did when he stood up to the 
oppressive warlords and initiated the Taliban’s crusade against ordinary people’s 
suffering.     
 
But this powerful symbolism did not long insulate the Taliban from a crisis of 
authority.  As early as January 1997, the Taliban faced a revolt from within the 
Kandahar heartland over forced conscription.104  At least four Taliban recruiters were 
killed by villagers who refused to join the army, and gunfights drove them out of 
several villages around Kandahar.  In Wardak and Paktia, too, Afghans fought 
conscription, with one elder famously explaining that “the Taliban have promised 
peace, instead they have given us nothing but war”.  In the end, the Taliban were 
increasingly compelled to rely upon recruits from Pakistani madrassas and Afghan 
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refugees settled there.105  As the economic situation worsened in the four years that 
followed and social strictures hardened, political alienation only deepened. 
 
The resurgent Taliban appear to have understood their past mistakes.  Their raison 
d’etre is summed up as follows, on the back of a 2009 booklet issuing regulations to 
Taliban fighters: “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe”.106  
Indeed, these jihad regulations, or Layehas, offer an important insight into the neo-
Taliban’s quest for legitimacy.  In the first place, they counsel against zeal and aim to 
instil discipline.  For example, if members of the Afghan National Army and National 
Police surrender, the Taliban are not to kill them.  On the contrary, “the mujahidin 
should take care of them very well, no matter if they come with or without a 
weapon”.107  If someone is accused of being a spy and there is no proof, they should be 
let go.108  Taliban fighters are also not allowed to force donations from people; “the 
people should be free, and they should be able to donate to any group that they 
want”.109  They are barred from smoking,110 from taking young boys without facial hair 
to the battlefield or to their homes,111 and from using jihad equipment or property for 
personal ends.112  Indeed, “every Talib is accountable to his superiors in matters of 
money spending and equipment usage”.113  The ideal Talib, then, is a disciplined and 
restrained strategic actor.  He is not fanatical and does not employ violence 
unthinkingly. 
 
Secondly, and related to this, the Layehas provide for a clear chain of command.  
District provincial commanders alone can authorise house searches and weapons 
confiscations,114 only the shura is to determine any dealings with NGOs,115 and if a Talib 
wants to infiltrate the Afghan government his group leader can dispense permission 
only after talking to the district authority which must talk to the governor.116  There are 
clear provisions for due process.  If a spy working for the Taliban is killed, his 
murderer must stand before an Islamic court.117  Any witnesses that testify in trials 
“must be in good psychological condition, possess an untarnished religious reputation, 
and not have committed any major crime”.118  If a spy is captured by the Taliban, one of 
three scenarios must apply: there are two witnesses willing to testify that he is a spy; 
the person voluntarily admits he is a spy; or there must be evidence indicating he is a 
spy, which is presented to the Imam.119  In this way, the Taliban’s military culture is 
informed by a deep sense of legality.   
  
Thirdly, the predominating assumption is that those who once worked for the Afghan 
government will have committed infractions which must be atoned for: “those who 
join the mujahidin, but who during their time working with the government took 
people’s personal property or money, should return it back.  The Islamic Emirate will 
not force them, but they should be responsible for all the bad things they have done in 
the past”.120  Further, the attendant assumption is that past evils can be redeemed.  
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While those who once killed Muslims on behalf of the Afghan government are not 
allowed to join the Taliban’s ranks, the Taliban will accept guarantees that they will be 
good from now on.121  Certainly, mercy is a recurrent theme in the Layehas.       
 
Fourthly, Taliban violence is enacted in a moral realm.  Important aspects of the Islamic 
jihad tradition are appealed to, and one Layeha begins with the assertion that “[jihad] 
can be achieved only if it is done according to the laws of God and to the framework of 
the established rules and regulations”.122  The jihad principle of last resort, which 
stipulates that force should be used only if it is unavoidable, is repeatedly invoked.  To 
begin with, and after the classical model,123 Taliban commanders are urged to reach out 
to all Afghans who support the government and/or the foreign presence, and invite 
them to return to Islam.124  Moreover, teachers and construction companies working for 
the enemy are to receive a warning before they are molested,125 and night letters 
(shabnamah) are routinely dispatched to warn collaborators to desist from their ways.126  
The principle of right intention is also drawn upon, as Talibs are told that “everything 
you do should be according to Islamic law and only for God”.127  Perhaps most 
crucially, strict Islamic protections for non-combatants are upheld.  Talibs are never to 
target civilians and “anyone with a bad reputation or who has killed civilians during 
the jihad may not be accepted into the Taliban movement”.128 
 
Fifthly, every province is told to set up a court with one judge and two Islamic experts, 
129 reflecting the Taliban’s attempts to embody a shadow government.  They are known 
to go after notorious criminals and, in parts of the country, they have set up an 
administration centred on the judiciary.  Based exclusively on the sharia and paid for by 
road tolls, the Taliban’s courts dispense quick justice and offer “a greater degree of 
predictability and reliability than the arbitrary behaviour of government security 
forces”.130  In addition, they have established a shadow cabinet and appointed shadow 
provincial governors.  The Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
was established in 2008, the logo for which appears on a variety of websites and 
publications, and a new ‘media bureau’ was also charged with a series of tasks ranging 
from the production of films to the gathering and organisation of statistics on martyrs 
who have fallen in battle with coalition troops.131  Taking the notion of ‘shadowing’ 
even further, after Barack Obama announced the troop surge in Afghanistan in 
November 2009, the Taliban announced its own surge in exchange.132 
 
In displaying the white flag of their shadow government wherever possible, the 
Taliban seek to depict themselves as omnipresent.  They erect patrols and checkpoints 
in small towns supposedly under government control, and they “openly wear the 
typical black turban as a reminder of the widespread presence of the Movement”.133  
The Taliban also strive to appear omniscient.  For example, during a conversation with 
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Canadian journalist Graeme Smith in 2007, one Taliban spokesman proudly showed 
that he knew the colour of the shopping bag that Smith had been holding as he walked 
out of the gates of the military base earlier that day.134  And in their infamous 
shabnamah—‘night letters’ used to deliver threats and decrees—the Taliban drop in 
such information as “consider your poor employee who will suffer.  He was in front of 
the house” and “I was following you from four in the afternoon until seven at night”.135 
 
Although never reluctant to issue threats when necessary, the Taliban strive to interact 
positively with the population.  Talibs are advised over and over again to have “good 
relationships with local people, so that the mujahidin will be always welcomed by local 
people, and they should always help them”.136  They are ordered to rise above tribal 
differences.137  Further, they must not commit barbaric acts which alienate the masses.  
For example, “cutting noses, lips and ears of people is completely prohibited”138 and, in 
2009, beheading in particular was condemned.  In a manner reminiscent of Ayman al-
Zawahiri’s instruction to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi to stop the spate of beheadings in 
Iraq in 2005 (“among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love 
and support you will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages… 
And we can kill the captives by bullet”139), Talibs are told that if someone is sentenced 
to death, he should be killed by gun.  Moreover, “photographing the execution is 
prohibited”. 140   Indeed, Mullah Omar publicly condemned the terror tactic of 
beheading, which was most likely learned from the insurgency in Iraq, and probably 
pioneered in Afghanistan by the Dadullah brothers.  Nevertheless, beheadings 




The Taliban were able to seize power in Afghanistan in the first place due to divisions 
among the mujahidin.  As M. J. Gohari argues, “mujahideen internal conflicts, which 
inflicted heavy damages and huge suffering on Afghanistan, provided the Taliban with 
a golden chance to verify their claim over the corruption and hypocrisy of their 
opponents”.141  As fighting militias representing specific localities, each mujahidin 
group had its own unique combination of ethnic and tribal support, and there were 
rivalry and violent clashes even between the Pashtun groups. 142 As Burnuhiddin 
Rabbani attempted to form a government in 1992, the old rivalry between the two main 
Islamist parties, Rabbani’s  Jamiat i-Islami and Hekmatyar’s more radical Hizb i-Islami 
took root, and tens of thousands of Kabulis fell in the fighting.  Rabbani’s own faction 
was beset with divisions, as his alliance with the famous military commander Ahmad 
Shah Massoud was rocked by polarising ethnic loyalties, with Massoud’s Panjsheris 
and Rabbani’s Badakshanis plotting against each other. 
 
In fact, the Taliban profited from another turf war which occurred within Benazir 
Bhutto’s government in Pakistan.  The ISI, which had been supporting Hekmatyar in 
his quest to capture Kabul, was undermined by Naseerullah Baber’s Ministry of the 
Interior.143  As considered earlier, after the Taliban rescued the Pakistani truck convoy, 
Baber took Mullah Omar under his wing.  The Bhutto government dropped 
Hekmatyar, who was increasingly viewed as a losing horse, and put all of its money on 
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the Taliban.  Bhutto aimed at strategic depth in the region as well as stability to 
facilitate trade and the transport of oil and gas from the Central Asian Republics. 
 
But while the Taliban exploited a series of divisions, they themselves were not unified.  
Afterall, the Taliban was a Pashtun-dominated movement embodying “the ethnic 
polarisation of a rural and segmented society under the banner of Islam”. 144  
Differences first emerged as the seizure of Kabul played out in 1996.  Some Taliban 
elements were open to making a deal with the Rabbani government, but the more 
purist leadership based in Kandahar spurned all efforts to reach a ceasefire.145  There 
were also divisions over how the Taliban should best capitalise on their momentum in 
Afghanistan and export the Islamic revolution.  While some believed that propaganda 
efforts to teach Muslims abroad about the Taliban’s achievements would suffice, others 
argued that financial and military assistance ought to be provided to other Muslim 
liberation movements.146  Divisions also surfaced over the role of women, relations 
with the west,147 and the presence of al-Qaeda’s largely Arab fighters on Afghan soil.  
In the end, like the mujahidin, the Taliban resorted to one-man rule with no 
organisational mechanism to accommodate other ethnic groups or points of view.  The 
struggle between moderate and hardline Taliban went underground, with no Taliban 
leader willing to contradict Mullah Omar.148  No doubt, the “eventual explosion within 
the Taliban” predicted by Ahmad Rashid in 2000 would have occurred in due course 
had it not been for the US-led invasion.   
   
Indeed, that invasion provided the neo-Taliban with the unifying mechanism of the 
defensive jihad.  However, that jihad has brought with it a potentially polarising 
element: foreign fighters.  Renowned for their brutality, thousands of mainly Arab and 
Pakistani fighters have set up dozens of camps in Afghanistan.  They bring to the 
Afghan jihad an extremist, Salafi interpretation of Islam that is less tolerant than the 
Hanafi tradition of most Afghans. During the jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, the 
thousands of ‘Gucci jihadis’ who flooded into Afghanistan in order to fulfil their 
Islamic duty of defending the umma, left behind them a religious and cultural legacy.  
They imported into the region a more puritanical strain of Islam which included anti-
Shism, opposition to Sufi customs and the broadening of the battle against the invader 
from military defence to cultural defence against a kafir onslaught.149  Today, that 
ideological legacy is built upon with a tactical one: as noted earlier, suicide bombings 
and beheadings were copied from Iraq and most likely taught to the Taliban by Arab 
fighters. 
 
Certainly, after the ‘Sunni Awakening’ in Iraq and the pursuant expulsion of foreign 
militants, many die-hard jihadis decamped to Afghanistan.  It is said that they wish to 
lead their own fighting units, but Taliban commanders make clear that “no foreign 
fighter can serve as a Taliban commander”.150  Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for 
Mullah Omar, denies that the Taliban is under al-Qaeda’s sway, underlining that, 
although people that want to come to fight are welcome, “we are from the country 
[Afghanistan], we are the boss.  We [do] not have any link with [al-Qaeda], they [do] 
not have any link with us”.151 Until his death in 2007, Mullah Dadullah, a proponent of 
beheadings and suicide bombing in Afghanistan who appeared in al-Qaeda 
propaganda material,152 was disliked by many other Taliban commanders.  In some 
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cases, as in Paktia and Kunar, local Taliban commanders asked foreign volunteers to 
leave in order to keep the population on side. 153 
 
In the nineteenth century, King Abdurrahman declared that any mullah whose 
whereabouts, nationality and parentage were not known would be expelled from 
Afghanistan, so that no stranger could come and foment discord.154  This suspicion of 
foreigners surely carries over into the modern day, as mainly Arab militants reveal 
extreme attitudes and engage in undisciplined behaviour.  Insights from internal al-
Qaeda communiqués reveal that many Arab fighters who came to Afghanistan during 
the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s and under Taliban rule in the 1990s had massive 
contempt for the ‘impure’ Afghan people.  Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, an al-Qaeda strategist 
who fought tirelessly against the hard line Salafi strain within the movement, 
despaired with the way his Arab colleagues behaved in Afghanistan.  They despised 
the population at large for its superstitious and deviant religious practices, which 
incorporated Sufi rituals, and many of them believed that the Taliban regime itself was 
ungodly and not a pure Emirate.155   
 
It can be assumed that these uncompromising views are as prevalent among the 
foreign fighters in Afghanistan today, and that this will be an important source of 
tension for the Taliban in the future.  “The Taliban are not a unified force—they are not 
the SPLA in Sudan or the Maoists in Nepal”156— there is plenty of scope of division.  
The unifying effects of the defensive jihad can only suppress difference for so long.  
When those differences do manifest themselves, and with a bang most probably, it is 
likely that one of the key dividing lines will concern the foreign element within 
Afghanistan. 
 
Moreover, and as a matter of policy, the existence of divisions within the Taliban 
combines with clear evidence of a sizeable moderate camp within the Taliban to 
recommend negotiations.  This moderate strain is necessarily ascendant in time of 
defensive jihad, and it seems important to capitalise on this state of affairs in order to 
carefully detach the softer core of the Taliban from its more hard-line fringe.  Given the 
growing legitimacy among the Afghan populace attendant to such moderation, it 
seems wise to listen to and empower the most moderate element within the movement, 
in the same surgical stroke.   
 
In sum, the foreign influence in Afghanistan and the integration of the Taliban into the 
global jihadi movement has had uneven effects.  On the one hand, the Taliban has been 
able to engage technology for both information and asymmetric warfare.  On the other 
hand, the foreign and especially Arab presence has brought with it radical ideologies 
and tactics.  If the former is a source of strength for the Taliban in its quest to become a 




At the height of Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi’s campaign of terror in Iraq, Osama bin Laden’s 
deputy warned him in a letter that “we don’t want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, 
who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Qandahar 
alone… When the invasion came, the Emirate collapsed in days, because the people 
were either passive or hostile”.157  The neo-Taliban, too, have sought to learn from the 
Taliban’s past mistakes—an urgency thrust upon the movement as it went from 
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embodying the government, to opposing it.  After all, the first canon of the insurgent is 
that he cannot survive without the support of the people.   
 
In a sense, and in opposition to the current trend in the rest of the Islamic world, the 
Taliban have moved away from neo-Fundamentalism back towards Fundamentalism, 
or old-fashioned Islamism.  While neo-Fundamentalism is a closed, scripturalist and 
conservative view of Islam which is obsessed with the narrow application of the sharia, 
Islamism is a political ideology and a product of modernity.  Often, as during the 
period of opposition to colonial rule, Islamism is accompanied by, and capitalises upon, 
fierce nationalist sentiments.  Neo-Fundamentalism targets society, while Islamism sets 
its sights on the state.  Neo-Fundamentalism defines Islam as a social and legal attitude 
prescribing external indicators of internal faith (beards, ankle-swinging thobes, the 
burqa); Islamism defines Islam primarily as a political system, and as the only means to 
political liberation. 
 
This shift, a devolution of sorts, occurred because of the exigencies of foreign 
occupation and thus the Taliban’s need for a wider legitimacy in order to fight (and so 
exist).  But the Taliban have a long way to go to become Islamists, principally because 
they do not know much about Islamism (or, it is sometimes said, Islam itself).  There 
has never been an Afghan Islamist intellectual, and Afghanistan has been isolated from 
the Islamic debates which occurred in the Middle East, both moderate and radical, 
ancient and ongoing.  Where the Taliban take control of territory, it is probable that 
they will fall back upon hold habits—by default, perhaps—and replicate the severe 
strictures of old.   
 
We have also seen that the Taliban integrated itself into the global jihad, but the global 
jihad is a poisoned chalice.  It provides the legitimising rhetoric of self-defence against 
the global Crusader and an arsenal of technological innovation, yet it brings with it a 
fanatical foreign presence and tactics like suicide bombing and beheading which 
alienate the populace and sow division within the ranks.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
